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Abstract: Against the backdrop of innovation fault-tolerance, government compensation for failed generic technological innovation projects is beneficial to stimulate re-
innovation behaviour. However, considering the information asymmetry, a collusion tendency exists between the compensated party and the evaluator during the process 
of compensation. To prompt the government to build collusion-proof mechanisms to reduce collusion loss, the evolutionary game method was used to build replicated 
dynamic equations and a Jacobian matrix of both sides based on the information topology between the conspirators and regulator. Through the evolutionary equilibrium 
analysis and numerical simulation, evolutionary stability strategies (ESS) under different topological relationship information (non-intersect, partial intersect, and inclusive 
type) were found. Results show that the collusion behaviour can be effectively restrained when the government is unaware of collusion information, the net defense income 
is positive, and the penalty threshold is the product of the net collusive income and the ratio of the collusive and regulatory information. With the increasing amount of 
collusive information available to the government, the conspirators tend to adhere to moral principles subject to strict regulation. In addition, the moderating effect of penalty 
factor is positively correlated with the private information possessed by both sides. The conclusion is beneficial to provide theoretical support for optimizing the government-
led compensation mechanism for failed generic technological innovation projects. 
 





The theory of endogenous growth shows that 
technological progress is the decisive factor in economic 
growth. Particularly, as a typical quasi-public good, the 
outcome of generic technological innovations can be 
shared by the entire industry, which will have a profound 
impact on the target technical area and related enterprises. 
However, the positive externality of technological 
innovations will inevitably lead to problems, such as 
market failure and insufficient investment in innovation 
actions. Apart from the market force, these actions 
facilitate the promotion of policy tools as an effective 
means to compensate for the externality of generic 
technological innovations [1]. Moreover, the problem of 
innovation incentive efficiency loss has attracted 
increasing attention in theoretical and business circles. 
Although relevant scholars believe that the government 
innovation subsidy is an important reference factor for 
innovation investment of enterprises, the difference of 
mode and intensity of subsidy has a crowding-out effect on 
the investment and efficiency of enterprise innovation. The 
crowding-out effect leads to the regular occurrence of rent 
seeking due to information asymmetry between the 
government and enterprise [2, 3]. Therefore, the 
investment level of generic technological innovation has 
been restrained by the crowding-out effect of governmental 
innovation incentive policy to a certain extent, thus 
evidently reflecting the efficiency loss of incentive policy 
[4, 5]. In this case, improvement of the effectiveness of 
innovation incentive has become an issue of intensive 
debate in society [6, 7]. 
Existing innovation incentive policies that support 
technological innovation mainly include policies on fiscal 
and taxation, special funds, procurement, and finance. These 
policies mostly focus on successful innovation or the front 
end of the technological innovation process. Attention on 
incentives for innovation failure is insufficient due to the 
existence of anti-failure bias [8, 9]. Furthermore, 
experimental principles of technological innovation 
contributed to the considerable uncertainty of technological 
innovation projects. The increasing intensity of market 
competition and innovation difficulties have also aggravated 
the high risk of technological innovation projects, thus 
leading to their failure. The commercial success rate of 
technological innovation projects is only 30% for AMD Inc. 
in the USA and other firms [10]. Meanwhile, according to 
the survey of technical innovation projects, 1884 of 2130 
firms in the six major industries of China had existing 
technological innovation activities that were either 
suspended or failed, accounting for 88.45% of projects. 
Thus, the failure of technological innovation projects is 
objective. The high uncertainty of generic technological 
innovation projects has been determined by the experimental 
nature of generic technological innovations, while the high 
risk will be further aggravated by the intensity of market 
competition and the complexity of innovation dimension. 
Therefore, technically and systematically speaking, generic 
technological innovation projects often face higher risks of 
failure than general technological innovation projects. 
Meanwhile, if further exploiting, then many failed generic 
technological innovation projects may still have the 
opportunity and potential for success. Occasionally, this 
potential may even be better than the original research 
design. Against the backdrop of innovation fault tolerance, 
the effective compensation of the government for failed 
generic technological innovation projects will stimulate the 
re-innovation behaviour and improve the re-innovation 
performance of failed projects. At present, some projects 
that failed in generic technological innovation, such as 
qualified enterprises or projects devoted to 
biopharmaceutical research & development, have been 
compensated by local governments and will be given a 
certain compensation for risk-taking. Within the industry-
oriented framework formulated by the government, the 
priority on project audit and support for tax reduction in 
terms of application, funding, and acceptance of generic 
technological innovation projects could be strengthened. 
The identification and evaluation of innovation failure are 
generally in the form of third-party delegations. However, 
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no specific prevention mechanism for potential collusion 
between the compensated party and the evaluator is 
available. 
In the compensation process for generic technological 
innovation failures, each participant considers how to 
make full use of the existing resources to maximize its own 
benefits. Due to the differences in objectives, it is very 
difficult to achieve unity among the supplier, the demander 
and the evaluator in prevention mechanism in current 
research. This paper proposes an internal mechanism 
consisting of the government, failed generic technological 
innovation projects and the third-party evaluator to analyse 
the relationships between the compensation players so as 
to explore the collusion-proof mechanism for 
compensation activities. 
 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Arrow introduced technological progress into the 
economic growth model to reveal the important role of 
technological innovation in economic growth [11]. 
However, in the process of technological innovation 
development, generic technological innovation has 
spillover effect characteristics of the typical public 
products. This condition makes it difficult for the 
enterprise to obtain all surplus profits from generic 
technological innovations and, reduce the return from firm 
private investment, and restrict the motive force of generic 
technological innovation. Solving the problem of 
insufficient investment in generic technological 
innovations by solely relying on the allocation and 
adjustment of resources in the market is difficult. Most 
scholars believe that the use of policy tools is an effective 
means to compensate for the externality of generic 
technological innovation. Using R&D subsidies, tax 
incentives, and government procurement to support and 
compensate for generic technological innovations can 
reduce the investment pressure and the risk perception of 
generic technological innovations to a certain extent and 
improve the expected income of generic technological 
innovations and the enthusiasm of R&D investment [12-
14]. With regard to the relationship between government 
subsidy and generic technological innovation, some 
scholars believe that government subsidy also has a 
“crowding-out effect” or “substitution effect” on generic 
technological innovations [15]. Government subsidy will 
have an incentive effect on investments of generic 
technological innovation within a moderate range. 
However, an excessively large subsidy will produce a 
“crowding-out effect” on private innovation input [16,17]. 
The compensation game relationship between the 
government and the enterprise has always been the focus 
of the debate in the field of innovation incentive. 
Owing to the uncertainty and high risk of generic 
technological innovation, the failure of generic 
technological innovation objectively exists [18]. In theory 
and in practice, the failure of generic technological 
innovation and the innovation incentive policy has gained 
increasing attention. Mining the internal value of the failed 
generic technological innovation is believed to have an 
important influence on improving the ability of 
independent innovation and intensifying the existing 
innovative resources. The failure problems originate from 
failure theory and gradually extend to the failure project 
research [19, 20]. With regard to the definition of the 
concept of innovation, Schumpeter clearly indicated that 
the achievement of expected earnings was the main symbol 
to determine the success of innovation. With the in-depth 
understanding of generic technological innovation, the 
examination on achieving innovation goals (the standard of 
innovation failure) has also become diverse. For example, 
establishing an effective market through generic 
technological innovation and considering numerous 
factors, such as socials, economic, and ecological benefits, 
possibly leads to the lack of a unified and clear consensus 
for the criteria on innovation failure in extant literature 
[21]. 
Considering the government’s lack of professionalism 
in the evaluation process of compensation targets, 
obstructions in accessing information regarding innovation 
failure and the possibility of rent seeking occurred in the 
government. According to the principle of information 
efficiency, the independent third-party agency with scale 
effect will be introduced for acquisition and evaluation of 
information. For failed projects, obtaining third-party 
verification may involve collusion with the third party to 
seek rent by disclosing false information. In the absence of 
collusion-proof mechanism, the third party may cater to the 
firm to defraud compensation products provided by the 
government. This condition will drive out “good money” 
in the potential compensation object and damage the entire 
social innovative efficiency and effectiveness. 
As previously mentioned, the government innovation 
subsidy has solved the market failure problem due to 
positive externalities of generic technological innovation 
and insufficient investment from the enterprise to a certain 
extent. However, the rent-seeking potential in the process 
of innovation incentives raises the problem of incentive 
efficiency [22]. The introduction of the third party aims to 
select and evaluate compensation objects of generic 
technological innovation failures. In this case, the 
enterprise tends to collude with the third party to defraud 
the government subsidy, which will damage the entire 
interest of the society [23]. Therefore, existing research has 
difficulty forming relatively clear conclusions on the 
following questions: how can one build the corresponding 
collusion-proof mechanism to solve the problem of adverse 
selection, information acquisition, and collusion 
occurrence? How can a third party be given full play in the 
process of compensation to form a complementary 
relationship with the government? How can the shortage of 
government with inefficient supervision be covered and the 





In summary, the failed projects, as the compensation 
objects, have superiority in information with regard to the 
process of compensation for generic technological 
innovation failure. Therefore, the government must 
introduce professional third-party evaluators to identify 
potential false information. Considering that each 
participant tends to maximize their own benefits, achieving 
incentive compatibility among suppliers, demanders, and 
evaluators in the compensation process is difficult. A 
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collusion tendency possibly exists between the demander 
and the evaluator while the supplier has to prevent potential 
collusive risks. As a result, the information topology 
between the conspirators (PE for short) and the 
government (G for short) will be established in this study 
based on information asymmetry, and then collusion-proof 
mechanism led by government can be designed. Through 
dynamic game under the asymmetric information, 
collusive risks and corresponding countermeasures can be 
revealed to deal with the problem of adverse selection and 
collusion after the introduction of the third party in the 
process of compensation. 
 
3.1 Four Types of Information Topology  
 
Information topological characteristics: In the 
construction process of the compensation selection model 
under information asymmetry, the failure information of 
generic technological innovation projects and the selection 
information of the third party are mostly private 
information, while the recognition and acquisition capacity 
of government are limited. Meanwhile, the compensation 
range and intensity, supervision willingness, and overall 
capacity of the government are mostly private information, 
while the acquisition capacity of the failed projects and the 
third party is limited. Therefore, the introduction of 
information topology between the fraud and defender to 
describe the asymmetric degree of information involves 
setting IG as information of the government (IG∈(0,1]), IPE 
as information of the failed projects and the third party 
(IPE∈(0,1]), and IG∩PE as shared information. 
Owing to the privacy of collusive behaviour and the 
confidentiality of the government’s supervision will, 
mode, and capacity, the information of conspirators is 
inconsistent with that of the defender. With regard to the 
information held by both parties as a set with boundaries, 
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Figure 1 Four types of information topology 
 
(1) The two types of information have no interference 
(IG∩PE =0). (2) The two types of information are partly 
intersected (0 <IG∩PE < min (IG, IPE)). (3) IG is contained in 
IPE (i.e., IG∩PE = IG). (4) IPE is contained in IG (i.e., IG∩PE = 
IPE). The diagram of the information topology of 
compensation for failed generic technological innovation 
projects can be constructed based on the aforementioned 
classification (Fig. 1). 
 
3.2 The General Setting 
 
Behavioral agents in collusion-proof mechanism and 
their strategies: as the compensated party, the failed generic 
technological innovation project must disclose relevant 
information regarding its failure to obtain compensation 
from the government. The third-party agency is 
commissioned by the government as a selector of 
compensation object and an evaluator of compensation 
effect. From the perspective of determining the collusion 
of the failed project with the third party, the behavioral 
strategies of (collusion, non-collusion) are respectively 
recorded as SPE= (α1, α2). The government, which is the 
supervisor and defender in the selection and evaluation of 
compensation object, has behavioral strategies (regulation, 
non-regulation) respectively recorded as SG = (β1, β2). 
Characteristics of bounded rationality: In reality, 
comparing the players cannot be perfectly rational but 
often rational on a limited basis [24, 25]. Bounded 
rationalities of the defender are mainly expressed as 
supervision will, which is determined through the strategy 
selection of the government with setting ρ as selection 
probability of β1 and 1−ρ as selection probability of β2. 
Bounded rationalities of the collusive parties are also 
mainly expressed as their own moral constraints and 
interpretation of the supervision [26]. For the collusive 
parties, apart from economic interests of rent seeking, their 
moral constraint and interpretation of the supervision will 
also influence collusive behavior. Collusion behaviors 
would occur only when the collusive parties tend to break 
their own moral bottom line and show fear of supervision 
deterrence. Suppose that the probability of morality 
undone is λ, and the probability of ignorance of the 
supervision deterrent is ω; then, α1 = λω and α2 =1−λω. 
Costs and benefits of game model: Set VG as the benefit 
of strict supervision, CG as the cost of strict supervision, LG 
as the loss of government, VPE as the benefit of collusion, 
CPE as the cost of collusion, and FPE as the punish factor for 
collusion (Tab. 1). 
 
Table 1 Definition of Main Variables  
Num Variable Definition 
(1) IG information of the government 
(2) IPE 
information of the failed projects and the third 
party 
(3) IG∩PE shared information 
(4) ρ selection probability of regulation 
(5) λ the probability of morality undone 
(6) ω the probability of ignorance of the supervision deterrent 
(7) VG the benefit of strict supervision 
(8) CG the cost of strict supervision 
(9) LG the loss of government 
(10) VPE the benefit of collusion 
(11) CPE the cost of collusion 
(12) FPE the punish factor for collusion 
 
3.3 Evolutionary Game Model 
 
In this study, the collusion-proof game model has been 
constructed in accordance with behavior relationships 
between the collaborator and the defender to explore 
collusive risk and collusion-proof mechanism under 
information asymmetry (Fig 2) [27]. Based on collusion-
proof payoff matrix in Fig. 2, replicator dynamics equation 
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is built as follows: 
 
d ( ) ( ) [ ( ) ]
d t t
θ t
θ t μ s μ
t
= × − ,                                              (1) 
 
where S is the collusive strategy set, SG = (α1, α2), SPE = (β1, 
β2); dθ(t)/dt is the growth rate of population ratio when the 
players choose some kind of strategy S at time t; θ(t) is the 
population ratio when the player selects the strategy S; ut(s) 
is the benefit of the player from this strategy; and tμ  is the 
average revenue. 
According to the collusion-proof game tree, the 
absolute return and average earnings of conspirators with 
different collusion strategies are expressed as follows: 
 
1 ( )
           ( )
PE PE PE G PE PEPE
G G PE PE






= − − −
− −
,                      (2) 
2 0PEE
αµ = ,                                                                       (3) 
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         ( ) ]
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= − − −
− −
,                  (4) 
 
The absolute return and average earning of the 
government with different collusion strategies are 
expressed as follows: 
 
1 ( )G G G G PE G PE GGE I V C I L I L
βµ λω λω∩= − + − ,              (5) 
2
PE GGE I L
βµ λω= − ,                                                         (6) 
[ ( ) ]
       (1 )
G G G G PE G PE GG
PE G
I V C I L I L
I L
µ ρ λω λω
λω ρ
∩= − + −
− −
            (7) 
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d
             ( ) ]
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               (8) 
( ) (1 )[ ( ) ]
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dF I V C I L
dt
ρ
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From Eqs. (8)–(9), the Jacobian matrix can be 
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Figure 2 Game tree of collusion-proof mechanism 
 
4 RESULT AND ANALYSIS 
4.1 Information Topology with Non-Intersect Type  
 
When information of the conspirators is inconsistent 
with that of the defender (i.e., IG∩PE = 0), the sign symbol 
of DetJ(λω, ρ) and TrJ(λω, ρ) can be determined by Eq. 
(10), which will obtain the evolutionary stable strategy 
(ESS) and replicated dynamic equation (Tab. 2). 
 
Table 2 Equilibrium Point and Stability Analysis in Case IG∩PE = 0 
Variable Value Equilibrium Point DetJ(λω, ρ) TrJ(λω, ρ) Stability 
1(a) VG＞CGand







E(0, 0) + + instability 
E(0, 1) - uncertainty saddle point 
E(1, 0) - uncertainty saddle point 
E(1, 1) + - ESS 
1(b) VG＞CGand







E(0, 0) + + instability 
E(0, 1) + - ESS 
E(1, 0) - uncertainty saddle point 











E(0, 0) - uncertainty saddle point 
E(0, 1) + + instability 
E(1, 0) + - ESS 
E(1, 1) - uncertainty saddle point 
1(d) VG＜CGand







E(0, 0) - uncertainty saddle point 
E(0, 1) - uncertainty saddle point 
E(1, 0) + - ESS 
E(1, 1) + + instability 
 
As shown in Tab. 2, when the information of the 
collaborator is inconsistent with that of the defender, the 
following results can be concluded. (1) If the net earning 
of government from collusion-proof behavior is positive 
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and the penalty factors FPE are larger than threshold IPE 
(VPE − CPE)/IG, then the equilibrium strategy of the 
conspirators is non-collusion (α2); otherwise, collusion (α1). 
(2) If the net earnings of government from collusion-proof 
behavior is positive, then the equilibrium strategy of the 
government is regulation (β1); otherwise, non-regulation 
(β2). Therefore, assuming any player cannot obtain 
information from each other, if the net earning of the 
government is positive and the penalty factors are larger 
than the threshold, then the ESS is (α2, β1). This finding 
means that the failed generic technological innovation 
projects and the third party do not demonstrate a collusion 
tendency (i.e., λ = 0 or ω = 0), while the government tends 
to keep these projects under strict supervision. 
Based on parameter assignment, a sample phase 
portrait for PE and G under the replicator dynamics in Case 
1(a) is given in Figure 3(1). Of the four stationary points of 
this phase portrait, only (λω = 1, ρ = 1) is asymptotically 
stable. The three other stationary points are unstable. A 
similar portrait exists in Cases 1(b), 1(c), and 1(d), and the 




Figure 3(1) Phase portrait in Case 1(a) under the replicator dynamics. The parameters are IPE=0.6, IG=0.4, IG∩PE=0, VG=50, CG=40, VPE=60, CPE=40, FPE=25, LG =20 
 
Figure 3(2) Phase portrait in Case 1(b) under the replicator dynamics. The parameters are IPE=0.6, IG=0.4, IG∩PE=0, VG =50, CG=40, VPE=60, CPE=40, FPE=35, LG =20 
 
Figure 3(3) Phase portrait in Case 1(c) under the replicator dynamics. The parameters are IPE=0.6, IG=0.4, IG∩PE=0, VG =20, CG=30, VPE=60, CPE=40, FPE=25, LG =20 
 
Figure 3(4) Phase portrait in Case 1(d) under the replicator dynamics. The parameters are IPE=0.6, IG=0.4, IG∩PE=0, VG =20, CG=30, VPE=60, CPE=40, FPE=35, LG =20 
 
4.2 Information Topology with Partial-Intersect Type 
 
When information of the conspirators is partially 
intersected with that of the defender (i.e., 0 < IG∩PE < min 
(IG, IPE)), the sign symbol of DetJ(λω, ρ) and TrJ(λω, ρ) can 
be determined by Eq. (10). This condition can help obtain 
the ESS and replicated dynamic equation (Tab. 3). 
Tab. 3 shows that when information of the conspirators 
is partially intersected with that of the defender, the 
following results can be concluded. (1) In case net earning 
of the government is positive, if the penalty factor FPE 
increased from less than the threshold to a high value, then 
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the equilibrium strategy of the conspirators evolves from 
collusion (α1) to non-collusion (α2) while the equilibrium 
strategy of government regulation (β1). (2) In case net 
earning of the government is negative and the penalty 
factor FPE is less than the threshold, the equilibrium 
strategy of the conspirators is collusion (α1) while that of 
the government evolves from non-regulation (β2) to 
regulation (β1) with the increasing shared information. (3) 
In case net earning of the government is negative and the 
penalty factor FPE is larger than the threshold, with the 
increase in shared information, the equilibrium strategies 
of the conspirators evolve from collusion (α1) to non-
equilibrium strategy while those of the government evolve 
from non-regulation (β2) to non-equilibrium strategy. 
Therefore, the collaborator and the defender partly possess 
shared information. In case net earning of the government 
from collusion-proof behavior is positive and the penalty 
factor is larger than the threshold, the ESS is (α2, β1). This 
condition means that the collusion will not occur (i.e., λ = 
0 or ω = 0). 
Based on parameter assignment, sample phase 
portraits for PE and G under the replicator dynamics in 
Case 2(a) to Case 2(f) are given in Fig.4(1)–4(6). 
 
Table 3 Equilibrium Point and Stability Analysis in Case 0 < IG∩PE < min (IG, IPE) 
Variable Value Equilibrium Point DetJ(λω, ρ) TrJ(λω, ρ) Stability 
2(a) VG>CGand ( )PE PE PE G PE PE
PE
G G PE








E(0, 0) + + instability 
E(0, 1) - uncertainty saddle point 
E(1, 0) - uncertainty saddle point 
E(1, 1) + - ESS 
2(b) VG＞CG and
( )PE PE PE G PE PE
PE
G G PE








E(0, 0) + + instability 
E(0, 1) + - ESS 
E(1, 0) - uncertainty saddle point 
E(1, 1) - uncertainty saddle point 
2(c) VG＜CG and
( )PE PE PE G PE PE
PE
G G PE








( )and 0 min[ , , ]G G GG PE G PE
G
I C VI I I
L∩
−
< <  
E(0, 0) - uncertainty saddle point 
E(0, 1) + + instability 
E(1, 0) + - ESS 
E(1, 1) - uncertainty saddle point 
2(d) VG＜CG and
( )PE PE PE G PE PE
PE
G G PE








( )and min( , )G G G G PE G PE
G
I C V I I I
L ∩
−
< <  
E(0, 0) - uncertainty saddle point 
E(0, 1) - uncertainty saddle point 
E(1, 0) + - ESS 
E(1, 1) + + instability 
2(e) VG＜CG and
( )PE PE PE G PE PE
PE
G G PE








( )and 0 min[ , , ]G G GG PE G PE
G
I C VI I I
L∩
−
< <  
E(0,0) - uncertainty saddle point 
E(0,1) - uncertainty saddle point 
E(1,0) + - ESS 
E(1,1) + + instability 
2(f) VG＜CG and
( )PE PE PE G PE PE
PE
G G PE








( )and min( , )G G G G PE G PE
G
I C V I I I
L ∩
−
< <  
E(0,0) - uncertainty saddle point 
E(0,1) - uncertainty saddle point 
E(1,0) - uncertainty saddle point 
E(1,1) - uncertainty saddle point 
E(λω*, ρ*) + 0 center 
 
 
Figure 4(1) Phase portrait in Case 2(a) under the replicator dynamics. The parameters are IPE=0.6, IG=0.4, IG∩PE=0.1, VG =50, CG=40, VPE=60, CPE=40, FPE=15, LG =20 
 
Figure 4(2) Phase portrait in Case 2(b) under the replicator dynamics. The parameters are IPE=0.6, IG=0.4, IG∩PE=0.1, VG =50, CG=40, VE1E2=60, CE1E2=40, FE1E2=30, LG =20 
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Figure 4(3) Phase portrait in Case 2(c) under the replicator dynamics. The parameters are IPE=0.6, IG=0.4, IG∩PE=0.1, VG =20, CG=30, VPE=60, CPE=40, FPE=15, LG =20 
 
Figure 4(4) Phase portrait in Case 2(d) under the replicator dynamics. The parameters are IPE=0.6, IG=0.4, IG∩PE=0.25, VG =20, CG=30, VPE=60, CPE=30, FPE=15, LG =20 
 
Figure 4(5) Phase portrait in Case 2(e) under the replicator dynamics. The parameters are IPE=0.6, IG=0.4, IG∩PE=0.1, VG =20, CG=30, VPE=60, CPE=40, FPE=30, LG =20 
 
Figure 4(6) Phase portrait in Case 2(f) under the replicator dynamics. The parameters are IPE=0.6, IG=0.4, IG∩PE=0.25, VG =20, CG=30, VPE=60, CPE=30, FPE=30, LG =20 
 
4.3 Information Topology with Inclusive Type І (IG⊂IPE) 
 
When information of the conspirators contains that of 
the defender (i.e., IG⊂IPE), the sign symbol of DetJ(λω, ρ) 
and TrJ(λω, ρ) can be determined by Eq. (10), which will 
help obtain the ESS and replicated dynamic equation (Tab. 
4). 
Tab. 4 shows that in case IG⊂IPE (i.e., IG∩PE = IG), the 
following results can be concluded:(1) If net earnings of 
the government from collusion-proof behavior are larger 
than those from non-regulation earnings, then the 
equilibrium strategy of the conspirators evolves from 
collusion (α1) to non-collusion (α2) then to non-equilibrium 
strategy while that of the government evolves from 
regulation (β1) to non-equilibrium strategy. (2) If net 
earnings of the government from collusion-proof behavior 
are less than those from non-regulation earnings, then the 
equilibrium strategy of the conspirators is collusion (α1) 
while that of the government is non-regulation (β2). 
Therefore, in case IG∩PE = IG, the penalty factor FPE will 
lose its regulatory role. For anti-collusion, net earnings of 
the government from collusion-proof behavior must be 
larger than those from non-regulation earnings, and the 
amount of information obtained by the government 
increases. Particularly, when net earnings of the 
government from collusion-proof behavior are positive and 
information obtained by the government is larger than the 
threshold, the ESS is (α2, β1). This finding means that the 
failed projects and the third party do not demonstrate a 
collusion tendency (i.e., λ = 0 or ω = 0) while the 
government tends to keep collusion under strict 
supervision. 
Based on parameter assignment, sample phase 
portraits for PE and G under the replicator dynamics in 
Case 3(a) to Case 3(f) are given in Figs. 5(1)-5(6). 
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Table 4 Equilibrium Point and Stability Analysis in Case IG⊂IPE 
Variable Value Equilibrium Point DetJ(λω, ρ) TrJ(λω, ρ) Stability 





< <  
E(0, 0) + + instability 
E(0, 1) - uncertainty saddle point 
E(1, 0) - uncertainty saddle point 
E(1, 1) + - ESS 
3(b) −LG<VG−CG<0 and





< <  
E(0, 0) - uncertainty saddle point 
E(0, 1) + + instability 
E(1, 0) - uncertainty saddle point 
E(1, 1) + - ESS 
3(c) VG>CG and ( )PE PE PE G PE PE
PE
I V C I I
V ∩
−
< <  
E(0, 0) + + instability 
E(0, 1) + - ESS 
E(1, 0) - uncertainty saddle point 
E(1, 1) - uncertainty saddle point 
3(d) −LG<VG−CG<0 and
( )PE PE PE
G PE PE
PE
I V C I I
V ∩
−
< <  
E(0, 0) - uncertainty saddle point 
E(0, 1) - uncertainty saddle point 
E(1, 0) - uncertainty saddle point 
E(1, 1) - uncertainty saddle point 
E(λω*, ρ*) + 0 center 
3(e) VG−CG<−LG and





< <  
E(0,0) - uncertainty saddle point 
E(0,1) + + instability 
E(1,0) + - ESS 
E(1,1) - uncertainty saddle point 
3(f) VG− CG<−LG and ( )PE PE PE G PE PE
PE
I V C I I
V ∩
−
< <  
E(0,0) - uncertainty saddle point 
E(0,1) - uncertainty saddle point 
E(1,0) + - ESS 
E(1,1) + + instability 
 
 
Figure 5(1)Phase portrait in Case 3(a) under the replicator dynamics. The parameters are IPE=0.6, IG=0.4, IG∩PE=0.4, VG =50, CG=40, VPE=60, CPE=15, FPE=15, LG =20 
 
Figure 5(2) Phase portrait in Case 3(b) under the replicator dynamics. The parameters are IPE=0.6, IG=0.4, IG∩PE=0.4, VG =20, CG=30, VPE=60, CPE=15, FPE=15, LG =20 
 
Figure 5(3) Phase portrait in Case 3(c) under the replicator dynamics. The parameters are IPE=0.6, IG=0.4, IG∩PE=0.4, VG =50, CG=40, VPE=60, CPE=40, FPE=15, LG =20 
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Figure 5(4) Phase portrait in Case 3(d) under the replicator dynamics. The parameters are IPE=0.6, IG=0.4, IG∩PE=0.4, VG =20, CG=30, VPE=60, CPE=40, FPE=15, LG =20 
 
Figure 5(5) Phase portrait in Case 3(e) under the replicator dynamics. The parameters are IPE=0.6, IG=0.4, IG∩PE=0.4, VG =20, CG=50, VPE=60, CPE=15, FPE=15, LG =20 
 
Figure 5(6) Phase portrait in Case 3(f) under the replicator dynamics. The parameters are IPE=0.6, IG=0.4, IG∩PE=0.4, VG =20, CG=50, VPE=60, CPE=40, FPE=15, LG =20 
 
Table 5 Equilibrium Point and Stability Analysis in Case IPE⊂IG 
Variable Value Equilibrium Point DetJ(λω, ρ) TrJ(λω, ρ) Stability 
4(a) VG>CG 
E(0, 0) + + instability 
E(0, 1) + - ESS 
E(1, 0) - uncertainty saddle point 
E(1, 1) - uncertainty saddle point 
4(b) VG>CG and ( )0 min[ , ]G G GG PE G
G
I C VI I
L∩
−
< <  
E(0, 0) - uncertainty saddle point 
E(0, 1) - uncertainty saddle point 
E(1, 0) + - ESS 
E(1, 1) + + instability 
4(c) VG<CG and ( )G G G G PE G
G
I C V I I
L ∩
−
< <  
E(0,0) - uncertainty saddle point 
E(0,1) - uncertainty saddle point 
E(1,0) - uncertainty saddle point 
E(1,1) - uncertainty saddle point 
E(λω*, ρ*) + 0 center 
 
4.4 Information Topology with Inclusive Type Ⅱ (IPE⊂IG) 
 
When information of the conspirators is more 
contained than that of the defender (i.e., IPE⊂IG), the sign 
symbol of DetJ(λω, ρ) and TrJ(λω, ρ) can be determined by 
Eq. (10), which will help obtain the ESS and replicated 
dynamic equation (Tab. 5). 
Tab. 5 shows that in case IPE⊂IG (i.e., IG∩PE = IPE), the 
following results can be concluded.(1) If net earnings of 
the government from collusion-proof behavior are positive, 
then the equilibrium strategy of the conspirators is non-
collusion (α2) while that of the government is regulation 
(β1). (2) If net earnings of the government from collusion-
proof behavior are negative, then the equilibrium strategy 
of the conspirators evolves from collusion (α1) to non-
equilibrium strategy while that of the government evolves 
from non-regulation (β2) to non-equilibrium strategy. 
Therefore, in case IPE⊂IG (i.e., IG∩PE = IPE), the penalty 
factor FPE will lose its regulatory role. For anti-collusion, 
the penalty factor can increase the amount of information 
grasped by the government. When the net earnings of the 
government from collusion-proof behavior are positive, the 
ESS is (α2, β1), which means that the enterprise and the 
third party do not demonstrate a collusion tendency (i.e., λ 
= 0 or ω = 0) while the government tends to keep them 
under strict supervision. 
Based on parameter assignment, sample phase 
portraits for PE and G under the replicator dynamics in 
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Case 4(a) to Case 4(c) are given in Fig. 6(1)–6(3).
 
 
Figure 6(1) Phase portrait in Case 4(a) under the replicator dynamics. The parameters are IPE=0.4, IG=0.6, IG∩PE=0.4, VG =50, CG=40, VPE=60, CPE=40, FPE=35, LG =20 
 
Figure 6(2) Phase portrait in Case 4(b) under the replicator dynamics. The parameters are IPE=0.4, IG=0.6, IG∩PE=0.4, VG =15, CG=30, VPE=60, CPE=40, FPE=35, LG =20 
 
Figure 6(3) Phase portrait in Case 4(c) under the replicator dynamics. The parameters are IPE=0.4, IG=0.6, IG∩PE=0.4, VG =20, CG=30, VPE=60, CPE=40, FPE=35, LG =20 
 
4.5 Further Discussion 
 
According to the evolutionary stability analysis under 
the four types of information topology, the evolutionary 
stability strategy of collusion-proof game is (α2, β1) when 
the following conditions are met: (1) VG > CG and FPE > 
[IPE(VPE − CPE)]/IG in Case IG∩PE = 0; (2) VG > CG and FPE 
> [IPE(VPE − CPE) − IG∩PEVPE]/(IG − IG∩PE) in Case 0 <IG∩PE 
< min (IG, IPE); (3) VG > CG and [IPE(VPE − CPE)/VPE] < 










  increasing  gradually
 
Figure 7 Phase Portraitin Case Increasing of CPE 
 
Furthermore, considering the non-equilibrium strategy 
E(λω*, ρ*), the group proportion of the conspirators with 
collusion strategy is λω* while that of the government with 
regulation strategy is ρ*; this condition is close to the actual 
situation in the real world. In case the collusive cost CE1E2 
increases to a certain degree, the collusive probability λω* 
under bounded rationality will not change correspondingly 
while the regulatory probability of the government ρ* will 
decrease correspondingly. This phenomenon means that 
the center of the evolutionary game model will move down 
(Fig. 7). However, in case collusive cost CPE rises to the 
same level as collusive income VPE, the collusive 
probability λω* under bounded rationality will be equal to 
0. The government will take measures to increase the 
collusive cost to reduce the collusive probability. In case 
CPE < VPE, λω* will not change while ρ* will decrease 
correspondingly. This condition indicates that the collusive 
probability will not decrease with increasing collusive cost 
promoted by the government. On the contrary, regulatory 
probabilities of the government will decrease. Meanwhile, 
the collusive probability will progressively increase when 
detected by the conspirators, prompting the government to 
provide additional social resources. Therefore, if the 
government tends to increase the difficulty of collusion for 
anti-collusion, then the collusive cost must be larger than 
the collusive income; otherwise, rushing into action is 
discouraged. 
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5 CONCLUSION 
 
The collusion-proof issue is an important part of 
institutional economics, and game theory is an important 
analytical tool for this field. Considering the potential 
collusive behavior between failed generic technological 
innovation projects and the third party, this study sets the 
government as the supervisor under the four types of 
information topology (non-intersect, partial-intersect, and 
inclusive type) to analyze the collusion-proof game for 
anti-collusion. Then, the evolutionary stability results can 
be concluded as follows:  
(1) In non-intersecting type, the government fails to 
gain access to the collusive information. Collusion 
between the failed generic technological innovation 
projects and the third party could only be effectively 
avoided if the net defense income is increased and the 
punishment is strengthened. Otherwise, the collusion will 
be inevitable. (2) With the increasing amount of collusive 
information available to the government, the collusive 
behavior can be limited to a certain extent, and potential 
conspirators tend to adhere to the moral principles or be 
fearful of strict regulation. (3) The regulatory role of the 
penalty factor is positively correlated with the amount of 
private information for each party. If the conspirators and 
the defender both have private information, then the 
punishment effect on collusion is significant; otherwise, 
the effect is insignificant. (4) Partial-intersect type is a 
general defense situation. In this case, if the net collusive 
income is still positive, instead of anti-collusion by 
increasing the collusive cost, then the regulatory behavior 
of the government will be restrained. 
Given the social network characteristics of 
compensation for failed generic technological innovation 
projects, considering multi-population structural factors in 
the social network will further explain the game model in 
accordance with the social reality. Simultaneously, 
bounded rationality of the conspirators can be further 
discussed through building moral choice models or 
deterrent perception functions based on the regulation 
efficiency of the government. This approach is conducted 
for further testing of the regulation efficiency of the 
government restrains the collusive tendency through 
influencing the perception of deterrence of conspirators. 
Meanwhile, different types of compensation mode (e.g., 
minimum guarantee for loss, compensation for loss, 
compensation for income, and exclusive of income or risk) 
and suitable game models can be designed with appropriate 
emulation technique to simulate and test the collusion-
proof mechanism despite the lack of practical 
compensation data for failed generic technological 
innovation projects. In addition, this study discusses the 
probability fluctuation of collusion and regulation, which 
provides another option in terms of solving the collusive 
problem of compensation and introduces corresponding 
risks. However, for this situation, reducing the probability 
of collusion and avoiding corresponding risks must be 
explored in the future. 
Finally, compared with the general 22 static games, the 
evolutionary game model established in this paper analyzes 
the game behaviours of the players in the process of 
compensation for generic technological innovation failures, 
which conforms to the reality. However, in the long run, it 
is far from enough to rely solely on government efforts as 
the government should not only implement compensations 
but also maintain a regulatory mechanism, whose 
effectiveness and efficiency will both be affected by its 
limited and insufficient resources. Therefore, in this regard, 
joint efforts are required from all walks of life. On the other 
hand, in the evolutionary game model, the factors that 
affect the subject behaviours in the compensation process 
are not fully considered, so the target selection and 
collusion-proof mechanism cannot be fully revealed and 
restored. This indicates that more factors should be 
incorporated to be more consistent with the actual situation, 
so that more practical countermeasures and suggestions 
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